Konflikten i Thailand

[MaiChai]

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Snacka om enkelspårighet...

PAD ställer till med den värsta krisen Thailand har varit med om på mycket länge, oppositionspartiet "Demokraterna", polis, militär och kungahus låter detta ske. Domstol ogiltigförklarar tre partier i regeringen för valfusk (övriga valfuskande partier slipper några repisalier). När ny regering skall utses så säger militären att det är bäst om det blir en ny koalitionsregering, alltså att PAD-supporterpartiet Demokraterna får regera, annars kan det bli oroligt igen...

Jag försvarar inte svågerpolitiken och korruptionen som finns i PPP och de andra partierna men när valet står mellan korrupta politiker valda av folket eller korrupta politiker som militär och en liten klick elitister iBangkok vill ha så väljer jag folkvalda eftersom dessa kan bytas ut i nytt val. Blir det militären och Bangkok-elit som får bestämma så kommer de fortsätta att välja korrupta politiker som ger dem mer makt och pengar utan att bry sig om övriga.

Vad gäller våldet så avstod faktiskt UDD från våld under sina demonstrationer. Visst kan de mycket väl ha legat bakom granatskjutningarna mm men om detta vet inget ännu, det kan också vara andra fraktioner som nu använder sig av våld medan UDD försöker bli mer rumsrena. PAD som skryter så mycket att de inte använder sig av våld gjorde just detta under sina demonstrationer. De gav sig på såväl taxichauförer, journalister och polis. De verkar till och med ha dödat en av sina egna och lämnat honom i en plastsäck när de lämnade Don Muang.

Eftersom inget parti har över 50% av platserna i parlamentet måste det väl bli en koalitionsregering, antingen byggd på PPP/Pheu Thai eller på Demokraterna. Ska det största partiet ha monopol på att bilda regering eller? Alternativet är en minoritetsregering och det lär ju inte hålla veckan ut i Thailand...

Att stödpartier i Thailand vänder kappan efter vinden kan väl inte ha kommit som någon överraskning för dig?

Vi räknar inte de två som dödades i Chiang Mai och Udon Thani då. De snubblade nog själv och det var en ren slump att de stödde PAD.

Det är nog den berömda "osynliga handen" som stått för granatbeskjtningarna, den tillhör antingen den röda eller gula sidan beroende på vem man frågar.

[buriram]

Även du MaiChai får väl upp ögonen någongång och tänker, hur har jag kunnat skriva så mycket skit.

Dags ock ta bort skygglapparna, har för mig att du har någon journalistisk bakgrund, du är i sådana fall ej ett föredömme för den yrkeskåren, om det inte är högerpartiets svar på Flamman eller liknande.

Hälsar anders, mitt i Isaan.

[Svorsk64]

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Även du MaiChai får väl upp ögonen någongång och tänker, hur har jag kunnat skriva så mycket skit.

Dags ock ta bort skygglapparna, har för mig att du har någon journalistisk bakgrund, du är i sådana fall ej ett föredömme för den yrkeskåren, om det inte är högerpartiets svar på Flamman eller liknande.

Hälsar anders, mitt i Isaan.

Tycker att du går lite väl långt när du dömer ut Maichai som journalist på det här viset.

Vore bra om du kunde visa vad han har skrivet som är skit. Gärna med linkar till fakta.

Svorsk64

[noBuzz]

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Även du MaiChai får väl upp ögonen någongång och tänker, hur har jag kunnat skriva så mycket skit.

Dags ock ta bort skygglapparna, har för mig att du har någon journalistisk bakgrund, du är i sådana fall ej ett föredömme för den yrkeskåren, om det inte är högerpartiets svar på Flamman eller liknande.

Hälsar anders, mitt i Isaan.

De argumentslösas retorik. Tror han hade samma lärare som Jing Jing. Kanske är de t.o.m varandras vapendragare?

[Vaxet]

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Även du MaiChai får väl upp ögonen någongång och tänker, hur har jag kunnat skriva så mycket skit.

Dags ock ta bort skygglapparna, har för mig att du har någon journalistisk bakgrund, du är i sådana fall ej ett föredömme för den yrkeskåren, om det inte är högerpartiets svar på Flamman eller liknande.

Hälsar anders, mitt i Isaan.

Patetiskt!

Maichai är en av de få här som verkligen satt sig in i Thailändsk politik. Dessutom har han vid ett flertal tillfällen gett knivskarpa analyser av läget samt rapporterat om händelseutvecklingen innan t.o.m. pressen gjort det.

Mer sånt tack.

[buriram]

Hej Svorsk, när man ENSIDIGT försvarar betalda samhällsomstörtare/anarkister och skiter i allt vad demokrati heter.

Det behövs inga länkar för det.  Det skulle vara intressant och veta vad MaiChai tror att Thailands befolkning kommer att tjäna på de s.k. demokraterna, få det bättre, knappast, den fattiges röst kommer bara vara värd en tiondel av de välbesuttnas i bl.a BKK  nästa val  ( om det blir något).

Hälsar anders mitt i Isaan        

[buriram]

Har man samma åsikt, så är allt annat patetiskt.  Ändamålet helgar medlen, men tyvärr ej de drabbade.

Hälsar anders mitt i Isaan 

[Guest Siam-Nilsson]

Thailand's monarchy - The king and them

Dec 4th 2008

From The Economist print edition

The untold story of the palace’s role behind the collapse of Thai democracy

Thailand’S tourism business, its export industries and its reputation have been wrecked by recent events. Crowds of royalists have occupied the government’s offices for months and then seized Bangkok’s airports. The police refused to evict them. The army refused to help. This week the siege was ended after the courts disbanded three parties in the ruling coalition. But the parties plan to re-form under new names and continue governing, so fresh strife threatens. It is as if a thin veneer of modernity, applied during the boom of the 1980s and early 1990s, has peeled away. Until recently a beacon of Asian pluralism, Thailand is sliding into anarchy.

The conflict began three years ago as peaceful rallies against corruption and abuse of power in the government of Thaksin Shinawatra. The protesters, wearing royal-yellow shirts and accusing Mr Thaksin of being a closet republican, got their way when royalist generals removed him in the coup of 2006. But on democracy’s restoration last year, Thais elected a coalition led by Mr Thaksin’s allies. The yellow-shirts of the inaptly named People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) revived their protests and adopted increasingly thuggish tactics, prompting Mr Thaksin’s supporters to don red shirts and fight back.

Speak it not

Throughout this conflict, the great unmentionable, not just for the Thai press but also for most foreign reporters, has been the role of King Bhumibol, his family and their closest courtiers. The world’s most ferociously enforced law against lèse-majesté (offending the crown) prevents even the mildest discussion of the palace’s role in Thai public life. Such laws are mostly in disuse elsewhere, but Thailand’s was harshened in the 1970s. Absurdly, anyone can bring a lèse-majesté suit. The police have to take seriously the most trivial complaints. All this makes the law a useful tool for politicians and others seeking a way to damage their foes. Often, the press is not allowed to explain the nature of any supposed offence against the crown, so Thais have no way to tell whether it really was so disrespectful.

The lèse-majesté law is an outrage in itself. It should not be enforced in any country with democratic pretensions. Worse is that the law hides from Thais some of the reasons for their chronic political woes. For what the king himself calls the “mess” Thailand is in stems in many ways from his own meddling in politics during his 62-year reign (see article). In part, the strife also reflects jockeying for power ahead of the succession. With the king celebrating his 81st birthday on December 5th, that event looms ever larger.

Much of the story of how the king’s actions have hurt his country’s politics is unfamiliar because Thais have not been allowed to hear it. Some may find our criticisms upsetting, but we do not make them gratuitously. Thailand needs open debate if it is to prepare for the time when a less revered monarch ascends the throne. It cannot be good for a country to subscribe to a fairy-tale version of its own history in which the king never does wrong, stays above politics and only ever intervenes on the side of democracy. None of that is true.

The official version of Thai history dwells on episodes such as the events of 1992, when Bhumibol forced the resignation of a bloodstained dictator and set his country on course for democracy. But many less creditable royal interventions have gone underreported and are seldom discussed. In 1976, paranoid about the communist threat, the king appeared to condone the growth of the right-wing vigilante movement whose members later took part in the slaughter of unarmed student protesters. In the cold war America saw Bhumibol as a staunch ally and helped finance his image-making machine. This long-standing alliance and the fierce lèse-majesté law have led Western diplomats, academics and journalists to bite their tongues and refrain from criticism.

After the 2006 coup, the 15th in Bhumibol’s reign, officials tried to tell foreigners that protocol obliged the king to accept the generals’ seizure of power. Thais got the opposite message. The king quickly granted the coupmakers an audience, and newspapers splashed pictures of it, sending Thais the message that he approved of them. In truth the king has always been capable of showing his displeasure at coups when it suited him, by rallying troops or by dragging his feet in accepting their outcome. And he exerts power in other ways. Since 2006, when he told judges to take action on the political crisis, the courts seem to have interpreted his wishes by pushing through cases against Mr Thaksin and his allies—most recently with this week’s banning of the parties in the government.

No fairy-tale future

In the imagination of Thai royalists their country is like Bhutan, whose charismatic new king is adored by a tiny population that prefers royal rule to democracy. In reality, with public anger at the queen’s support for the thuggish PAD and the unsuitability of Bhumibol’s heir simmering, Thailand risks the recent fate of Nepal, which has suffered a bitter civil war and whose meddling king is now a commoner in a republic. The PAD was nurtured by the palace and now threatens to engulf it. An enduring image of the past few days is that of PAD toughs shooting at government supporters while holding up the king’s portrait. The monarchy is now, more clearly than ever, part of the problem. It sits at the apex of a horrendously hierarchical and unequal society. You do not have to be a republican to agree that this needs to be discussed.

As The Economist went to press, on the eve of the king's birthday, he was reported to be unwell, and unable to deliver his usual annual speech to the nation. So he had still not repudiated the yellow-shirts' claims to be acting in his name. His long silence has done great damage to the rule of law in Thailand. He could still help, by demanding, as no one else can, the abolition of the archaic lèse-majesté law and the language in the current charter that supports it, and so enable Thais to have a proper debate about their future. He made a half-hearted stab at this in 2005, saying he should not be above criticism. But nothing short of the law’s complete repeal will do. Thailand’s friends should tell it so.

Thailand's king and its crisis - A right royal mess

Dec 4th 2008 | Bangkok

From The Economist print edition

Thailand’s interminable political conflict has much to do with the taboo subject of its monarchy. That is why the taboo must be broken

EVEN the most revered of kings, worshipped by his people as a demigod, is not immortal. Thais were reminded of this last month when six days of ornate cremation ceremonies, with gilded carriages and armies of extras in traditional costumes, were held for Princess Galyani, the elder sister of their beloved King Bhumibol Adulyadej (pictured above). There was talk in Bangkok of the princess’s funeral being a “dress rehearsal” for the end of Bhumibol’s reign, 62 years long so far. Making one of few public appearances this year, shortly before his 81st birthday on December 5th, the king did indeed look his age.

The funeral only briefly calmed a political conflict that has raged for three years between supporters of Thaksin Shinawatra, the prime minister ousted by royalist generals in the 2006 coup, and an opposition movement backed by much of Bangkok’s traditional elite, apparently including Queen Sirikit. But the day after the ceremonies ended a grenade exploded among anti-Thaksin protesters, killing one. The anti-government protesters, the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), who had been occupying Government House since August, then seized Bangkok’s main airports, causing chaos. The siege was lifted only eight days later, after a court dissolved the main parties in the pro-Thaksin coalition government.

Mr Thaksin is in exile, convicted in absentia of corruption. But a government dominated by his allies has governed since democracy returned in last December’s elections. It looks poised to carry on under new party names despite the court ruling. Last month Mr Thaksin staged a huge rally of his “red shirt” supporters to remind his “yellow shirt” royalist foes in the PAD, who claim to be protecting the king against Mr Thaksin’s supposed republicanism, that he remains Thailand’s most popular politician.

Besides justified concerns about Mr Thaksin’s abuses of power, one of the royalists’ worries is that he was building, through populist policies such as cheap health care and microcredit, a patronage network and popular image that challenged the king’s. Another fear is that Mr Thaksin’s alleged generosity to Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn in the past was intended to build up influence with him once he succeeds to the throne. For these and other reasons, the little-told back-story of King Bhumibol is vital to understanding the predicament of this country of 64m people.

Many Thais will squirm at what follows, and will prefer the fairy-tale version of the king’s story. But the king’s past actions are root causes of a conflict dividing the country, and need to be examined.

Bhumibol’s tale, even if stripped of the mythology his courtiers have spent decades constructing around him, is exceptional. The American-born son of a half-Chinese commoner accidentally inherits a throne close to extinction and revives it, creating one of the world’s most powerful and wealthy monarchies, and surely the only one of any significance to have gained in political power in modern times. The king’s charisma, intelligence, talents (from playing the saxophone to rain-making, a science in which he holds a European patent) and deep concern for his people’s welfare make him adored at home and admired around the world. His image perhaps reaches its zenith in 1992, after the army shoots dozens of pro-democracy protesters in Bangkok, when television shows both the army leader (and prime minister) Suchinda Kraprayoon and the protest leader, Chamlong Srimuang (now a PAD stalwart), kneeling in an audience with him. Shortly afterwards General Suchinda resigns, and the king is given credit for the restoration of democracy.

However, Bhumibol’s story is also that of a king who lost faith in democracy (if he ever really had it), who constantly meddled behind the scenes in politics and thus, in the twilight of his reign, risks leaving behind a country unprepared for life without “Father”, as Thais affectionately call him. Understanding why a country that was until recently a beacon of pluralism in Asia has become such a “mess”, as the king put it in 2006, is impossible without lifting the thick veil of reverence surrounding him.

This is not easy because, paradoxically, a king whose adulation by his subjects is supposedly near-universal is nevertheless deemed to need protection, in the form of the world’s most ferociously enforced lèse-majesté law. Whereas other monarchies have mostly abolished or stopped enforcing such laws, Thailand’s was made harsher in the 1970s. Even the most mild, reasoned criticism of the monarchy is forbidden, punishable by up to 15 years in jail. This has had a remarkable effect not just on Thais but on successive generations of Western diplomats, academics and journalists who, with few exceptions, have meekly censored themselves.

All the king’s men

The origins of this, in part, were in the Vietnam war, in which America found King Bhumibol a staunch anti-communist ally. Recognising his value as an anti-red icon, America pumped propaganda funds into a campaign to put the king’s portrait in every Thai home. Even today, although quick to decry undemocratic moves in other Asian countries, America rarely protests at the arrests of Thais and foreigners for criticising the monarchy. Foreign journalists and academics need visas and access to officialdom to do their jobs, and thus have played down the royal angle to any story.

As a result of this conspiracy of silence, only one serious biography exists of one of Asia’s most important leaders. “The King Never Smiles”, by Paul Handley, an American journalist (2006), notes that the king’s restoration of the power and prestige of the Thai monarchy “is one of the great untold stories of the 20th century.”

Mr Handley says that in the two intervening years nobody has disputed the main facts in his book; not even the most damning stuff, which explodes the myth that the king rarely intervenes in politics and then only on the side of good. Perhaps his gravest charge is that in 1976 the king seemed to condone the growth of right-wing vigilante groups that, along with the army, were later responsible for the slaughter of peaceful student protesters. As has happened often in modern Thai history (and could easily happen again now), the 1976 unrest was used as a pretext to topple the government and replace it with a royally approved one.

Bhumibol was 18 when he took the throne after the mysterious death of his ineffectual brother, King Ananda, in 1946. He promptly came under the sway of his uncles, princes itching to restore the power and wealth the crown had lost when the absolute monarchy was abolished in 1932. As he grew into his robes in the 1950s he created a comprehensive patronage system. The award of honours in exchange for donations to royal causes made the monarchy the predominant fount of charity. This “network monarchy”, as it was dubbed by Duncan McCargo, a British academic, put the king back at the centre of Thai society and recovered much of his lost power.

A theme now embraced with gusto by the PAD, inspired by the king’s speeches over the years, is that electoral politics is irretrievably filthy and that Thailand would do better with ad hoc rule by royally favoured “good men”. The epitome of these is General Prem Tinsulanonda who, as unelected prime minister in the semi-democracy of the 1980s, did more than anyone else to foster the idea of the king’s near-divinity. Now president of the privy council, General Prem is also supposedly above politics. But this too is a myth: he is widely seen as the mastermind of the 2006 coup. Shortly beforehand he told the army that the king was its “owner” and Mr Thaksin merely a replaceable “jockey”.

The PAD is a motley bunch, united only by fanatical hatred of Mr Thaksin. It includes disgruntled businessmen, aristocratic ladies, members of a militaristic Buddhist outfit, formerly anti-monarchist intellectuals and reactionary army types. Its “new politics”, consisting of a partly appointed parliament, sweeping powers for military intervention and, of course, a strong crown, is “Premocracy” redux.

The army is a big part of the country’s predicament. Its generals believe they have a right to remove any government that incurs its, or the palace’s, displeasure—taking its cue from the monarchy that has approved so many of its coups. These two obstacles to Thailand’s democratic development are inextricably interlinked.

Mr Handley criticises the way the king has undermined the rule of law. When he has intervened to make known his wishes, his influence is such that it is taken as an order. In an example too late for the book, months before the 2006 coup the king ordered the country’s judges to do something about the political crisis. In a recording of a phone call between two Supreme Court judges shortly afterwards, later posted on the internet, one says they need to avoid the perception that they are following palace orders because “foreigners wouldn’t accept it”.

Since then, their interpretation of the king’s wishes has become increasingly clear, as the courts have rushed through cases against the former prime minister and his allies, while going easy on their critics. Some cases, such as the corruption allegations against Mr Thaksin, clearly deserved the courts’ attention. Others were trivial, such as the court-ordered sacking in September of Samak Sundaravej, the pro-Thaksin prime minister, for doing a television cookery show. In contrast, rebellion charges against the PAD’s leaders over their seizing of Government House were watered down and the courts freed them to continue the occupation.

None of this is to absolve Mr Thaksin and his cronies of their sins. But even his gravest abuse—a “war on drugs” in 2003, in which police were suspected of hundreds of extra-judicial killings—was not entirely his fault. The dirty war against supposed drug-dealers was misguidedly supported by Thais of all social classes. Even the king, in an equivocal speech that year, sounded at times as if he approved of it.

Father knows best

Other countries, from Spain to Brazil, have overcome dictatorial pasts to grow into strong democracies whose politics is mostly conducted in parliament, not on the streets. Thailand’s failure to follow suit is partly because “Father” has always been willing to step in and sort things out: his children have never quite had to grow up. The Democrats, the parliamentary opposition, are opportunists, cheering on the PAD while seemingly hoping for another royally approved coup to land the government in their lap.

The rage of Bangkok’s traditional elite against Mr Thaksin stems partly from embarrassment at having originally supported him. When he came to power in 2001 there was a feeling that Thailand needed a strong “CEO” leader, as the former businessman presented himself. His then party, Thai Rak Thai (TRT), was the first in Thai history to win a parliamentary majority on its own, and formed the first elected government to serve a full term, after which it was re-elected. Mr Thaksin’s policies of improved public services and credit for the poor, though self-serving, promised to improve an unequal, hierarchical society: another reason why the old palace-linked elite wants him eliminated.

The government of generals and bureaucrats installed by the 2006 coup-makers performed miserably. In last December’s elections, though TRT had been disbanded, Mr Thaksin’s new People’s Power Party won most seats. This spurred the PAD to resume its protests. In clashes in October PAD members fought the police with guns, bombs and sharp staves, hoping the army would again use disorder as the pretext for a coup. The PAD nevertheless blamed the clashes entirely on police brutality, and the anti-Thaksin Bangkok press let it get away with this. The death of one PAD member, apparently blown up in his car by the bomb he was carrying, was quickly buried. But the death of a young woman, reportedly when a police tear-gas canister exploded, became a cause célèbre.

Up to this point there were only whispers as to why the PAD enjoyed such lenient treatment—even from the army, which refused to help the police remove protesters from government offices. However, rumours of an extremely influential backer were confirmed when Queen Sirikit, attended by a clutch of cameramen, presided over the dead woman’s cremation. The king remained silent.

Nobody can discuss, of course, what effect the queen’s support has had on the majority of Thais who still, apparently, back Mr Thaksin. A whirl of lèse-majesté accusations have been made against pro- and anti-Thaksin figures. But the PAD’s ever more menacing behaviour, the palace’s failure to disown it, and the group’s insistence that Thais must choose between loyalty to Mr Thaksin and to the king, may be doing untold damage to the crown itself. Some of Mr Thaksin’s voters must be contemplating the flip-side of the PAD’s argument: if the monarchy is against the leader they keep voting for, maybe it is against them. Such feelings may only be encouraged by the PAD’s condescending arguments that the rural poor, Mr Thaksin’s main support base, are too “uneducated” to have political opinions, so their voting power must be reduced.

At a pro-Thaksin rally in July a young activist ranted against the monarchy, calling the king “a thorn in the side of democracy” for having backed so many coups, and warning the royal family they risked the guillotine. She was quickly arrested. What shocked the royalist establishment was not just the startling criticism of the king—but that the activist was cheered. “It is more and more difficult for them to hold the illusion that the monarchy is universally adored,” says a Thai academic.

This illusion is crumbling amid growing worry about what happens when the king’s reign ends. The fears over Mr Thaksin’s past influence on the crown prince are overshadowed by far deeper ones about the suitability of the heir to the throne. Vajiralongkorn has shown little of his father’s charisma or devotion to duty, and in his youth suffered from a bad reputation. In a newspaper interview he defended himself against accusations that he was a gangster. But even his mother, in an extraordinary set of interviews on a visit to America in 1981, conceded he was a “bit of a Don Juan”. “If the people of Thailand do not approve of the behaviour of my son, then he would either have to change his behaviour or resign from the royal family,” she said.

The Thai press dutifully self-censored and certainly would not repeat these criticisms now. Nevertheless, the crown prince will probably remain deeply disliked. There has been speculation over the years that the king might pass the crown to the much more popular Princess Sirindhorn, who now does most of his job of touring the country to meet the masses. The 8pm nightly royal news on television constantly shows her, smiling through endless visits and ceremonies, making merit at Buddhist temples and doing other good works. In the crown prince’s rare appearances he looks reluctant and stiff, and is rarely seen meeting ordinary people.

The patrilineal tradition of the Chakri dynasty is unlikely to be broken. And the prominent role played by the crown prince in Princess Galyani’s cremation removed any doubts about whether he was the chosen heir, says a Thai academic. Even so, many Thais, a superstitious people, will remember an old prophecy that the dynasty would last for only nine generations—Bhumibol is the ninth Chakri king—and that a tenth would be a disaster.

Some day my prince…

For all these reasons, a former senior official with strong palace ties says there is a terror of what will come after Bhumibol. “When we say ‘Long live the king’ we really mean it, because we can’t bear to think of what the next step will be,” he says. Most Thais are too young to remember a time before Bhumibol took the throne. His death will be a leap into the unknown. It would seem wise for royal advisers to be doing some succession planning. But, says the former official, none seems to be going on. And any advice offered would probably not be heeded: “The king is his own man. Nobody advises the king,” he says.

In the shorter term, a trigger for renewed confrontation may be, if a pro-Thaksin government survives, its plan to amend the constitution passed during the military regime that followed the 2006 coup. Some mooted changes, such as restoring a fully elected Senate, seem reasonable. But the PAD assumes the main motive is to relieve Mr Thaksin and his allies of the various legal charges against them. Neither side yet seems willing to compromise. Both have made clear their readiness to use street mobs to achieve their ends.

A messy but effective “Thai-style compromise” is still hoped for, to pull the country back from the brink. It is even possible to dream of the red- and yellow-shirt movements transforming themselves into a well-behaved, mainstream two-party system with broad public participation. This, in turn, might help the country escape the dead hand of the courtiers and generals who are trying to drag the country into the past. But none of this is likely.

If Bhumibol’s glittering reign either ends in conflagration or leads to a Thailand paralysed by endless strife, with nobody of his stature to break the deadlock, it will be a tragedy. But he will have played a leading role in bringing about such an outcome. There is of course an opposing case to be made—that the king has been a stabilising influence in a volatile age, that his devotion to duty has been an inspiring example and that he has only ever done what he thought best for the country. But that case has been made publicly, day in, day out, for decades. Thais are not allowed to discuss in public the other side of the coin.

[Tallviking]

Vore det inte betydligt enklare att bara länka till dessa artiklar ?

[Guest Siam-Nilsson]

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Vore det inte betydligt enklare att bara länka till dessa artiklar ?

Säkert så, men varför ska allt var enkelt när man kan krångla till det..he he

[Tallviking]

Fråga dom som surfar med långsamma förbindelser eller mobiltelefoner vad dom tycker om det ?

[zwa]

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Fråga dom som surfar med långsamma förbindelser eller mobiltelefoner vad dom tycker om det ?

Bara text och inga bilder. De borde bli glada som slipper surfa in på de långsamma orginallänkarna om de vill läsa!

[ban99arne]

Exactemente, snålar man med sitt breda band får man allt skylla sig själv.

Bandbredaren Arne

[Guest jing jing]

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De argumentslösas retorik. Tror han hade samma lärare som Jing Jing. Kanske är de t.o.m varandras vapendragare?

Bravo Buzzen

Vill påminna dig om vad du själva har skrivit! Visst... de vore väl fel att saga du är argumentslös.

"

Det handlar om kunskap och förståelse. Skulle du låta barn utforma säkerhetsbestämmelser för bilkörning?

Och det handlar om hurvida en röst från en person med avsaknad av kunskap och insikt ska vara värd lika mycket som en röst från en person med inblick."

[noBuzz]

[Guest lars60]

Dyr nota för båda flygplatserna enl BP!

http://www.bangkokpo...put-at-b500-mln

News » Local News

Airport losses put at B500 mln

Published: 11/12/2008 at 11:41 PM

The eight-day blockade of the two Bangkok airports by anti-government protesters last month cost the Airports of Thailand more than 500 million baht, the acting AoT president Serirat Prasutanont said on Thursday.

The eight-day blockade of the two Bangkok airports by anti-government protesters last month cost the Airports of Thailand more than 500 million baht, the acting AoT president Serirat Prasutanont said on Thursday.

The seizure and sit-in of Suvarnabhumi and Don Mueang airports which ended on Dec 3 cut much of the country's contact with the world, and did serious damage to tourism and the export industries.

The AoT chief said that airport officials will file lawsuits against PAD protesters and related parties to try to recover the agency's losses.

Mr Serirat, who is also director of Suvarnabhumi international airport, said the siege at the two airports had also led to losses of revenue at airports in other provinces.

He said initial estimates of losses totalled more than 500 million baht, excluding the incalculable negative impact on travellers' confidence, which could affect Thailand for years to come.

AoT executives will discuss with legal experts and the Attorney General's Office on how to estimate the total loss more precisely, and would file lawsuits against the protesters before the end of January, he said.

Meanwhile, Wing Commander Prateep Wichittoe, deputy director of Suvarnabhumi airport, said the average daily flow of passengers had fallen more than 44 per cent to 55,737 persons since the airport had resumed full service on Dec 5.

Cargo transport at the airport also declined to an average of 2,395 tonnes daily from 3,365 tonnes, said Wing Cdr Prateep.

Average daily departure and arrival flights at Suvarnabhumi international airport also fell to 496 from the 714 registered before it was shut down by the protesters, he said. (TNA)

[Guest Atom]

Quote

Även du MaiChai får väl upp ögonen någongång och tänker, hur har jag kunnat skriva så mycket skit.

Dags ock ta bort skygglapparna, har för mig att du har någon journalistisk bakgrund, du är i sådana fall ej ett föredömme för den yrkeskåren, om det inte är högerpartiets svar på Flamman eller liknande.

Hälsar anders, mitt i Isaan.

Buriram, det var onodigt och direkt lagt skrivit. Politik ar i mangt och mycket subjektivt och bedomningar av vad som ar bra eller daligt kommer oftare fran ens varderingar an fran kalla fakta. Du har den fulla ratten att dra slutsatsen att TRT/PPP varit bra for Thailand precis som MaiChai, och jag ocksa for den delen, har ratten att dra slutsatsen att de inte varit bra for Thailand aven om iaf jag haller med om att de pa kort sikt varit bra for Isaan.

Trots allt, MaiChai har alltid tydligt forklarat varfor han inte gillar TRT/PPP, ofta underbyggt med lankar till trovardiga kallor. Nagot sadant har jag aldrig sett fran dig, om det beror pa bristande kunskap eller intresse vet jag inte men det gor ju onekligen att man laser MaiChai's inlagg med storre intresse an dina inlagg. Jag laser aven inlagg fran tex Svarten med stort intresse sa det har inget med vilken "sida" skribenten star pa utan bara formagan/intresset att forklara varfor man tycker pa det ena eller andra viset.

Nu far du ju Buri Ram's starka familj som king maker i den nya regeringen sa det blir nog bra for er.

[Guest lars60]

Vote for new premier scheduled for Monday

By The Nation

Published on December 12, 2008

http://www.nationmul...cs_30090792.php

Members of Parliament will meet on Monday to elect a new prime minister. The news came yesterday as the Democrat-led coalition unveiled its Cabinet line-up.

[MaiChai]

Quote

Även du MaiChai får väl upp ögonen någongång och tänker, hur har jag kunnat skriva så mycket skit.

Dags ock ta bort skygglapparna, har för mig att du har någon journalistisk bakgrund, du är i sådana fall ej ett föredömme för den yrkeskåren, om det inte är högerpartiets svar på Flamman eller liknande.

Hälsar anders, mitt i Isaan.

Har under de tio år som jag bott i Thailand befunnit mig i Khon Kaen, Udon Thani, Phuket utöver Bangkok under lägre perioder. Så jag är inte "Bangkok blind" eller blåblodig på något vis. Min arbetsgivare är nöjd med vad jag producerar då jag alltid skriver objektivt om ämnet, det hindrar mig dock inte för att ha en privat åsikt. Take it or leave it!

Ett mynt har alltid två sidor, men Thaksin såg bara till att den ena sida syntes och fortfarande ses uppe i Issan. Samma sak med PAD, de visar bara på Thaksins dåliga sidor trots att han faktiskt gjorde en hel del bra för framförallt Issan och norra Thailand.

Hade du studerat Thailändsk politik så hade du noterat att det finns inget direkt vänsterparti, även om TRT/PPP/Pheu Thai gärna vill kalla sig det. Det finns bara högerpartier i Thailand och de flesta är uppgyggade runt klaner/familjer/områden. Shinawatras i Chiang Mai, Banharn i Suphanburi, Snoh i Si kaew, Newin i Buriram och Yougyut i Udon Thani.

Ideologi saknas nästa helt och hållet och dessa stödpartier väljer sida efter var pengarna kommer att finnas i framtiden. Men du behöver inte vara orolig då Buri Rams starke man Newin Chidchob vänt kappan efter vinden och numera stöttar Demokraterna. För att militären sagt det till honom? Knappast så fruktar Newin militären utan han inser att han kan får mer att säga til om i en Demokratledd regering. Dr T körde över honom i och med valet av Somchai Wongsawat som PM; i september, nu hämnas Newin för detta. Som nam na...

Ifall fler faranger lär sig att se igenom propagandan från båda sidor och lär sina Thailändska vänner detsamma så kommer Thailand snart att göra sig av med klanväldet som styrt det här landet under alltför många år.

Jag har följt 3 valrörelser i Thailand med TRT och en med PPP och jag har aldrig sett ett så systematiskt sätt att köpa röster. Men att ursäkta det med att "alla" gör det är ju uppåt väggarna, varför inte anordna en auktion istället? Högstbjudande får styra Thailand de nästa 4 åren...

[ban99arne]

MaiChai, du som följer politiken på nära håll, lite frågor som jag funderat på.

Varför är det endast regeringen som åtalas och fälls i konstitutionsdomstolen, är de de enda som köpt röster?

Var finns bevismaterialet publicerat någonstans?

MVH/BanArne

[svarten]

Hej MaiChai!

Som fortsättning till BanArnes fråga undrar jag om du har förstått varför korruption bekämpas genom att upplösa tre partier i stället för att åtala korrumperade individer. Det finns också representanter från demokratiska partiet som har köpt röster. Varför ska de gå fria och tillåtas att fortsätta? Varför straffa oskyldiga väljare i t.ex. Isaan som numera inte har något parti att välja ifrån?

Någon kanske misstänker att kampen mot korruption utnyttjas för att avskaffa oönskade partier.

Hälsning

Svarten

[MaiChai]

Quote

MaiChai, du som följer politiken på nära håll, lite frågor som jag funderat på.

Varför är det endast regeringen som åtalas och fälls i konstitutionsdomstolen, är de de enda som köpt röster?

Var finns bevismaterialet publicerat någonstans?

MVH/BanArne

När det gällde TRT så lästes ju domskälen upp i direktsänd TV, tog väl nästa 12 timmar om jag inte missminner mig. I den rättegången var också Demokraterna åtalade för valfusk men frikändes på grund av bristfällig bevisning. Hur bra utredningarna gjorts kan jag inte svara på...

I PPP´s fall rör det sig om Udon Thanis starke man Youngyut som fälldes med ganska klara bevis redan i våras för valfusk i en lägre instans, stötestenen för konstitutionsdomstolen har ju varit huruvida han skulle anses som en av de ledande i partiet. Eftersom han ingick i partistyrelsen så ansåg man det. Men att det ska ta så lång tid att reda ut är ju inte bra.

Bevisen finns publicerade i en rejäl lunta. Allt på domstolsthai givetvis...

[MaiChai]

Svarten,

Demokraterna satt på samma bänk som TRT åtalade för valfusk förra året, de frikändes dock på grund av bristande bevisning. Jag har inte läst utredningarna.

Väljer man att åtala individerna och inte straffa partiet kan det ju till slut räcka med att du har 1 person som är "ren" för att kunna behålla ett styre som du i princip har köpt dig till. Enskilda medlemmars valfusk bör ju också få konsekvenser för partiet om partiet gynnats av dem eller hur?

[ban99arne]

Ja, man kan ju inte låta bli att fundera på att det är den folkvalda regeringen som fälls upprepade gånger och dess medlemmar som utesluts men att oppositionens fusk inte går att bevisa ..

Hur många röster hade Youngyout köpt, enligt den överväldigade bevisföringen?

Var detta inte en lag som militärjuntan införde/modifierade i samband med att man störtade den folkvalda regeringen förra gången?

Väljer man att åtala individerna och inte straffa partiet kan det ju till slut räcka med att du har 1 person som är "ren" för att kunna behålla ett styre som du i princip har köpt dig till. Enskilda medlemmars valfusk bör ju också få konsekvenser för partiet om partiet gynnats av dem eller hur?

Än konstigare blir det om man hindrar folketsvilja pga av att en "smutsig" person köpt en röst.

MVH/BanArne

[MaiChai]

Banarne,

är det folkets vilja att de som har betalt mest för rösterna ska få regera så tycker jag nog att auktionsidén låter som ett bättre alternativ än demokrati.

Det finns dock vägar och system att minimera röstköp men inga partier i Thailan verkar vara sådär jättesugna på att ta till de metoderna...

Den bästa lösningen vore att bannlysa alla partier och att banna alla som någonsin har haft en politisk position i Thailand och börja om från noll...